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FIXED RATE VERSUS ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGES: 
EVIDENCE FROM EURO AREA BANKS 
 
by Ugo Albertazzi*, Fulvia Fringuellotti** and Steven Ongena** 
 
Abstract 
Why do some residential mortgages carry a fixed interest rate and others an adjustable 
rate? To answer this question we studied unique data from 103 banks belonging to 73 
different banking groups across twelve countries in the euro area. To explain the large cross-
country and time variations observed, we distinguished between the conditions that determine 
the local demand for credit and the characteristics of banks that supply credit. As bank 
funding mostly occurs at the group level, we disentangled these two sets of factors by 
comparing the outcomes observed for the same banking group across the different countries. 
Local demand conditions dominate. In particular we find that the share of new loans with a 
fixed rate is larger when: (1) the historical volatility of inflation is lower, (2) the correlation 
between unemployment and the short-term interest rate is higher, (3) households' financial 
literacy is lower, and (4) the use of local mortgages to back covered bonds and of mortgage-
backed securities is more widespread. 
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1 Introduction1
Conventional mortgages can be classified in two main types: fixed rate mortgages and
adjustable rate mortgages. Fixed rate mortgages (FRMs) charge a nominal interest
rate that does not change during the entire life of the loan. Adjustable rate mortgages
(ARMs) charge an interest rate that is tied to a benchmark and varies over time.
Households that select an ARM are exposed to the short-term variability in the
periodic payments required by this type of mortgage (Campbell and Cocco, 2003).
The volume of FRMs and ARMs extended to households in the economy depends on
a broad set of factors that affect the demand of borrowers and the supply of lenders
(ECB, 2009).
A striking feature of the credit market in the euro area is the very large hetero-
geneity across countries in the granting of fixed versus adjustable rate mortgages.
FRMs are dominant in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands, while ARMs
are prevailing in Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain (ECB, 2009; Campbell,
2012). The variation in the share of FRMs to total new mortgages differs across
countries as well, with little variation over time in Germany and Portugal, but far
more in Italy and Greece (ECB, 2009). This observed variation across countries and
over time has two major implications. First, the transmission of monetary policy is
heterogeneous across countries. Being a major liability in the balance sheet of most
households, mortgages likely play a key role in the transmission of monetary policy
(Di Maggio et al., 2017). This is especially true in systems where ARMs are domi-
nant because, on top of the traditional bank lending channel, also the floating rate
channel is at work, with significant macroeconomic effects.2 Second, the allocation of
interest-rate risk between the banking sector and the real sector differs across coun-
tries, with direct consequences for financial stability. In light of that, investigating
the determinants of the prevalent type of mortgage across countries and over time is
crucial in order to derive normative insights.
In this paper we exploit unique bank-level information on lending activity in the
euro area in order to understand what drives the prevalence of FRMs or ARMs. In
particular, we investigate to what degree the wide cross-country heterogeneity in the
prevalent interest rate type of mortgage is driven by differences in demand or supply
conditions.
From a methodological perspective, we distinguish the role played by borrower
1A significant part of the analysis was conducted during visiting periods of Fulvia Fringuellotti
at the Bank of Italy, whose kind hospitality is gratefully acknowledged. We would like to thank two
anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank Christoph Basten,
Martin Brown, Geraldo Cerqueiro, Marc Chesney, Hans Degryse, Manthos Delis, Leonardo Gam-
bacorta, Emilia Garcia-Appendini, Michel Habib, Artashes Karapetyan, Luc Laeven, Stefano Neri,
Per O¨stberg, Fabio Parlapiano, Alessandro Secchi, Stefano Siviero, Javier Suarez, Ignazio Visco,
Alexander F. Wagner and Wojciech Zurowski; seminar participants at the Bank of Italy, and the
University of Zurich; participants at the SFI Research Days 2017, and the 11th Swiss Winter Confer-
ence on Financial Intermediation. Steven Ongena acknowledges financial support from ERC ADG
2016 - GA 740272 lending. The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors only and
do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy and the ECB.
2Ippolito et al. (2017) define the floating rate channel as the mechanism whereby conventional
monetary policy actions are transmitted directly to borrowers’ balance sheet via a change in the
interest rate paid on outstanding (indexed) loans.
5
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210730 
specific characteristics from that of bank specific factors. The former include all
features that make borrowers demand one or the other type of mortgage, as well as
those that make a borrower more or less suitable to be financed at a fixed rate.3 The
latter include funding and liquidity conditions, which may influence the ability of
banks to supply FRMs.4
Our identification strategy relies on the assumption that funding takes place at
the consolidated level. Lending policies are mainly influenced by fund-raising and
liquidity conditions. Funding is defined and mainly occurs at the consolidated level.5
Thus, the ability and willingness of a banking group to grant loans with certain
features is also mainly determined at the consolidated level, particularly when the
group operates in a monetary union, such as the euro area. Similar considerations
apply to bank liquidity. Our assumption is in line with the focus of market investors
and regulators on consolidated bank balance sheets and with the literature on cross-
border banks as shock propagators, where local lending conditions are affected by
shocks to the consolidated balance sheet (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Schnabl,
2012; Ce´le´rier et al., 2018).6
Intuitively, this allows us to disentangle borrower demand from bank supply by
comparing, on the one hand, the lending patterns observed for the same cross-border
banking group in different economies and, on the other hand, the lending patterns
observed across different cross-border banking groups operating in the same economy.
In practice, we decompose the variation of the share of FRMs to total new mort-
gages, henceforth abridged with “share of FRMs”, into “country demand factors”
and “bank supply factors”, using a fixed effects model and exploiting cross-border
banking groups. This approach is close in spirit to Amiti and Weinstein (2016) and
Greenstone et al. (2015). Country demand factors capture specific features of the
borrowing country which are more related to loan demand, that is to the character-
istics of borrowers in that country, whilst bank supply factors capture funding and
liquidity conditions which are relevant for lending supply.
3The riskiness of the lending exposure determines whether a mortgage can be financed through
long-term funds at a fixed rate, for example, by issuing covered bonds or mortgage-backed securities.
If a loan can be used to back covered bonds or mortgage-backed securities, the bank can offer a more
convenient fixed interest rate.
4Typically, banks rely on short-term funding at adjustable rate. A natural consequence is that
banks are more willing to supply ARMs. But to the extent that they can raise long-term funds at
fixed rate, banks are also able to supply FRMs. This holds true as long as banks keep an exposure
to interest rate risk, as documented by Hoffmann et al. (2017). Indeed, if banks were to fully hedge,
they would be equally willing to supply FRMs and ARMs. Analysing bank specific characteristics
allows us also to shed light on banks’ exposure to interest rate risk.
5Cross-border banks define their funding mix as to minimize the cost of capital (Gu et al., 2015).
Long-term funding instruments are issued taking into account differences across countries in terms of
taxation, regulation, quality of required services and infrastructures, as well as development of capital
markets. For example, banks can raise funds through cross-border securitisation or concentrating
covered bonds issuance in certain countries. Despite cross-border banks can select different funding
models, funding mainly occurs at the consolidated level. While showing a shift towards a more
decentralized funding at the onset of the recent financial crisis, Gambacorta et al. (2017) document
that cross-border banks’ liabilities from foreign affiliates amount only to 41% of total funds raised
overseas.
6Bank supervision activity almost exclusively focuses on consolidated balance-sheet conditions,
including the level of interest rate risk (BCBS, 2012; ECB, 2014). Additionally, the design of banks’
surveys is typically aimed at gauging lending standards at the consolidated level.
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One main advantage of our approach is that we are able to jointly investigate the
role played by demand and supply conditions. Moreover, we are not bound to select
a list of proxies for demand and supply factors, as typically done in the literature.
Making such a selection is difficult as one cannot be sure that the list is exhaustive
and, more importantly, that the variables under consideration truly capture only
demand or only supply.7 On the negative side, our estimated country demand factors
are not directly interpretable in economic terms, as they are likely to encompass
a heterogeneous set of variables. Thus, as a second step, and in the same vein of
Ongena and Smith (2000), we adopt a two-stage approach whereby the estimated
demand factors are regressed on variables that are economically motivated.
Our main finding indicates a prominent role for country demand factors which
explain almost 72% of the total variation in the share of FRMs observed in the sample,
as opposed to 19% associated with bank supply factors (the remaining 9% being the
variation that the model is unable to explain). A number of robustness exercises
show that this result is confirmed when we use a larger dataset including smaller and
domestic institutions, as well as when we adopt a non-linear model specification.
In a first extension of the baseline regressions we explore more in detail the time
variation in the share of FRMs, which turns out to be strongly and negatively corre-
lated with the term spread, that is the slope of the yield curve. In line with the main
findings, the results of this exercise suggest that changes in the term spread mainly
entail changes in the demand for FRMs, relatively to ARMs. Specifically, 79% of the
variation in the share of FRMs driven by the term spread is ascribable to demand
factors. The elasticity of demand on the term spread differs across countries.
We more broadly explore the economic variables behind the cross-country differ-
ences in local demand conditions, according to the two-stage procedure, as described
above. The variables selected are taken from the existing literature, but we also put
emphasis on a novel variable that has not been considered so far. We start from the
observation that if households expect to be unemployed when interest rates are low,
the ARM provides households with an insurance coverage (while the FRM does not).
This simple (but at first sight somewhat counterintuitive) remark leads us to check
whether the share of FRMs is related to the correlation between the unemployment
rate and the short-term interest rate. This correlation turns out to be highly signifi-
cant and economically relevant in explaining the demand component of the share of
FRMs. Specifically, an increase in the correlation between the unemployment rate
and and the short-term interest rate by one standard deviation (an increase of 0.49)
leads to an increase of 14 percentage points in the average share of FRMs per country
explained by demand conditions.
Concerning the statistical significance of the other (more standard) economic fac-
tors underlying the demand (having controlled for supply side factors), we document
7There exist factors that in principle may exert a role in shaping both demand and supply
conditions of FRMs, relative to ARMs. This is the case, for example, for legislation on issuance of
covered bonds. Namely, if its effect is to allow banks to issue such instruments, then it is exerting
an effect on the supply of FRMs. If instead its effect is to make a mortgage issued locally eligible
to be used as collateral for covered bonds, for instance due to specific requirements in terms of
loan-to-value (ECBC Covered Bond Comparative Database; ECB, 2008; ECBC, 2016), then it is
exerting an effect on the demand of FRMs. For these reasons, it is difficult to separate demand from
supply based on pre-selected lists of proxies for the two sides of the market.
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a role for financial literacy, whose effect turns out to be negative, in line with the no-
tion that more educated borrowers can better understand complex financial products
such as ARMs.8 One standard deviation increase in financial literacy (an increase of
8 percentage points) entails a decrease of 42 percentage points in the average share of
FRMs per country. Households in countries where the covered bonds market is more
developed are more likely to borrow at a fixed rate, given that such bank funding
instruments backed by mortgages are typically issued at long maturities and at fixed
rates.9 For a similar reason, also the volume of securitized mortgages entails a higher
likelihood of households selecting a FRM.10 An increase in the outstanding amount of
mortgage covered bonds and residential mortgage-backed securities, scaled by GDP,
by one standard deviation (corresponding to 6 percentage points for both) leads to an
increase of 32 and 17 percentage points, respectively, in the average share of FRMs
per country explained by the demand. Finally, high historical volatility of inflation
is strongly and negatively related to the share of FRMs, consistently with the idea
that the macroeconomic history of a country affects households’ mortgage choice.11
A one standard deviation increase in the historical inflation volatility (an increase of
9 percentage points) entails a decrease of 59 percentage points in the average share
of FRMs per country.
We complete our study adopting a similar approach to explain prices instead of
quantities, that is considering as dependent variable the spread between FRMs and
ARMs interest rates, rather than the share of FRMs. Our findings indicate that
also the spread between FRMs and ARMs interest rates is mainly driven by demand
conditions.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Next section reviews the existing
literature and explains the contribution of this work. Section 3 discusses the identifi-
cation strategy. Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 presents the methodology
and the results of the analysis on the share of FRMs. Section 6 integrates the pre-
8Financially educated borrowers are more familiar with the concepts of fixed interest rate, ad-
justable interest rate and interest compounding. As such, they are able to grasp that the interest
rate applied on an ARM and that of a FRM are not equivalent at the inception of the loan. In-
deed, the interest rate on a FRM embeds not only the expectation of the future short-term interest
rate, but also a term premium and the cost of the prepayment option (Campbell and Cocco, 2003).
Selecting an ARM rather than a FRM allows to avoid these add-ons.
9Funding via covered bonds is a factor that could clearly indicate both shifts in demand (i.e.,
borrower specific) and shifts in supply (i.e., lender specific). Although the supply side might play a
stronger role, what are we capturing in our setting is whether households’ characteristics in a given
country make mortgages more ore less eligible to secure covered bonds. As such, we are focusing on
the demand component of this factor.
10Banks engagement in loan securitization can be driven both by demand and supply conditions.
Since we control for the supply side, our factor catches only the demand component that is of major
interest.
11Countries with higher volatility of inflation before the introduction of the euro were characterized
by a strong prevalence of ARMs. This is in line with the idea that, if a FRM can be prepaid without
penalties, high inflation risk leads banks to reduce the supply of FRMs by increasing the interest
rate applied on such loans. As a consequence households are more likely to select ARMs (Campbell,
2012; Badarinza et al., 2017). Alternatively, this may signal the existence of a stronger insurance
motive attached to ARMs (countries with higher inflation risk are those where households are more
likely to be unemployed when the short-term interest rate is very low). The fact that ARMs continue
to dominate the mortgage market of these countries even after the entry to the eurozone suggests a
certain stickiness in households’ behavior (Campbell, 2012).
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ceding with some robustness checks. Section 7 presents the results of the analysis on
the spread between FRMs and ARMs interest rates. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature and Contribution
2.1 Demand and Supply Factors
The existing literature provides both theoretical modeling and empirical evidence on
the determinants of the prevalent type of mortgage. A wide range of demand factors
and supply factors may drive the choice between FRMs and ARMs.
As for demand factors, an important role is ascribed to borrower’s financial condi-
tion and level of education. In a pioneering work, Campbell and Cocco (2003) derive
relevant theoretical predictions by treating mortgage choice as a problem in house-
hold risk management. In their framework, households subject to binding borrowing
constraints at the time of the loan application, such as low income and low level of
savings, are likely to choose the loan with the lowest interest rate. In general, this is
then an adjustable rate as a fixed interest rate will include a term premium and the
cost of the prepayment option.12 Yet, an ARM exposes households to the income risk
of short-term variability in the periodic payments. Thus, households with a limited
income risk bearing capacity, for example in case of high loan-to-income ratio and
low financial wealth, are likely to select a FRM.
Several empirical papers have extensively investigated the role of income, savings,
indebtedness and financial wealth in the choice of housing loans relying on households’
income and wealth surveys (Paiella and Pozzolo, 2007; Fornero et al., 2011; Ehrmann
and Ziegelmeyer, 2017). These studies provide a general support for the predictions
of Campbell and Cocco (2003).
Borrowers’ education, especially the degree of financial literacy, is an important
driver of mortgage choice as well (Agarwal et al., 2010; Fornero et al., 2011; Gather-
good and Weber, 2017). In general, more educated borrowers have a deeper under-
standing of the intrinsic features of ARMs and FRMs. On the one hand, they are
aware that, unconditionally, a FRM is more expensive than an ARM, due to the term
premium and the cost of the prepayment option mentioned above. For this reason,
they are more likely to select an ARM (Agarwal et al., 2010; Gathergood and Weber,
2017). On the other hand, they are also mindful of the potential exposure to income
risk if they choose an ARM (Fornero et al., 2011).
Supply factors consist in bank funding and liquidity conditions. In general, the
composition of liabilities affects, and is affected, by the type of loan a bank is more
willing to offer and thus the quoted interest rates (Kirti, 2017). A few empirical
studies indeed show that lower bank bond spreads, lower deposit pass-through, lower
exposure to interest rate risk and higher access to securitization make banks more
prone to extend fixed rate loans (Fuster and Vickery, 2014; Foa` et al., 2015; Basten
12The interest rate on an ARM is close to the short-term interest rate. The interest rate on a
FRM is related, instead, to the long-term interest rate. The existence of a term premium and a cost
of early repayment means that the interest rate on a FRM is not equivalent to the expectation of
the future short-term interest rate. As a consequence, at inception of a loan the the interest rate on
an ARM and the interest rate on a FRM are not equivalent.
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et al., 2017).
Beside these rather intuitive factors, there exist a set of macroeconomic factors
that exert their effects either through demand or supply. These include current and
future expected interest rates, as well as the unemployment rate and the macroeco-
nomic history of a country.
The current spread between the interest rates on FRMs and ARMs is a leading
factor of mortgage choice (Paiella and Pozzolo, 2007; Koijen et al., 2009; Fornero
et al., 2011; Badarinza et al., 2017). This suggests that households behave myopically,
selecting the type of loan that requires the lowest payments at the time of the loan
application. However, households’ expectations on the future interest rate applied on
ARMs play a role as well, but only over the short horizon of one year (Koijen et al.,
2009; Foa` et al., 2015; Badarinza et al., 2017).
The difference between long-term and short-term interest rates is a component
of the spread between FRMs and ARMs interest rates. As such, the current term
spread is also a determinant of mortgage choice (Koijen et al., 2009; Basten et al.,
2017; Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer, 2017). Since in the literature on the bank lending
channel the level of interest rates is recognized to be able to shift both the demand
and the supply of credit, one can surmise that the term spread may act as a shifter
of both the demand and the supply of FRMs, relatively to ARMs.
The historic volatility of inflation plays an important role in the choice of mort-
gages as well. Countries with a history of high volatility of inflation prior to the
introduction of the euro show a prevalence of ARMs (Campbell, 2012; Badarinza
et al., 2017). This persists even after the adoption of the euro, suggesting a substan-
tial inertia in households’ behavior (Campbell, 2012).
The volatility of the unemployment rate, as a proxy for households’ expected
income, is an additional driver of the prevalent type of mortgage. In countries with
high volatility of the unemployment rate households are more likely to select a FRM,
as future income is expected to be unstable (Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer, 2017).
Guren et al. (2017) emphasize the prominent role in mortgage choice of the mon-
etary policy reaction function to aggregate shocks. If the central bank decreases
interest rates in response to a crisis, an ARM provides households with higher insur-
ance benefits allowing a higher degree of consumption smoothing. We are the first to
test empirically this prediction including among our country demand factor a novel
variable, namely the correlation between the unemployment rate and the short-term
interest rate.
Table 1 summarizes all the determinants of mortgage choice identified in the lit-
erature, as well as those analysed in this study.
2.2 Contribution
The existing literature investigates the plethora of factors driving the choice between
FRMs and ARMs, mainly focusing on one specific country and without providing
information on the relative importance of demand and supply factors. To the best of
our knowledge, the works of Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2017) and Badarinza et al.
(2017) are the only two papers to examine the determinants of mortgage choice across
countries.
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Using a new household wealth survey, the Eurosystem household finance and
consumption survey, Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2017) provide a deep investigation
of the demand side, but ignore completely the supply side. Relying on monthly
country-level information, Badarinza et al. (2017) analyse how current and future
expected interest rates affect the time variation in the share of ARMs to total new
mortgages. They partially investigate the cross-country variation as well, but look
exclusively at the role played by the historic volatility of inflation. Both these studies
are not able to investigate jointly the broad spectrum of demand and supply factors
driving mortgage choice, neither to disentangle them.
We are able to overcome these limitations by using unique granular bank-level
information on a sample of intermediaries operating in twelve countries in the euro
area. The structure of our dataset allow us to take a step towards identifying demand
and supply of FRMs, relatively to ARMs. Specifically, we rely on an identification
strategy that utilizes cross-border banking groups to disentangle country demand
factors from bank supply factors. In this way we are able to rigorously examine to
what extent the wide cross-country heterogeneity and time variation in the prevalent
interest rate type of mortgage is driven by demand or supply conditions.
Assessing the relative importance of demand and supply is crucial because the
policy implications may differ substantially depending on what is the actual driver.
Eventually, we are the first to explore the role of demand and supply also on the
relative price of FRMs and ARMs.
3 Identification
Our identification strategy builds on the idea that funding takes place at the con-
solidated level. This allows us to disentangle demand from supply by comparing the
lending behavior of the same cross-border banking group in different countries, as
well as the lending behavior of different cross-border banking groups operating in the
same economy.
Our identification strategy is supported by several facts. First, lending policies are
mainly driven by bank funding and liquidity conditions. In a cross-border banking
group funding is defined at the consolidated level as to minimize the cost of capi-
tal. For example, Gu et al. (2015) show that international banks raise debt through
subsidiaries operating in countries with a more favorable tax system. In general,
cross-country differences in terms of taxation, regulation, bureaucracy, services and
infrastructure, as well as development of capital markets have a crucial role in the
way banks issue long-term funding instruments. For instance, international banks
can raise funds relying on cross-border securitisation or concentrating covered bonds
issuance in certain countries. Indeed, covered bonds legislations in most European
countries, with the exception of Greece and the Netherlands, allow to include mort-
gages originated abroad (typically in the European Economic Area and in Switzer-
land, or more broadly in OECD countries) in the covered pool (ECBC Covered Bond
Comparative Database; ECB, 2008; ECBC, 2016). Additionally, in a cross-border
banking group funding mainly occurs at the consolidated level. Although interna-
tional banks have progressively adopted a more decentralized funding model after
the recent financial crisis, Gambacorta et al. (2017) show that cross-border banks’
11
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liabilities from foreign branches and subsidiaries represent, even recently, still 41% of
total funds raised abroad. For similar reasons, also liquidity conditions are defined at
the consolidated level. As a consequence, the ability and willingness of a cross-border
banking group to grant loans with given characteristics is also mainly determined
at the consolidated level. This is especially true if the group operates in a monetary
union, such as the euro area, characterized by homogenous regulations and integrated
capital markets.
Second, when looking at cross-border banks, market investors and regulators are
mainly focused on consolidated balance sheets. For example, the “core principles
for effective banking supervision” depicted by the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision markedly refer to the assessment of consolidated balance sheet conditions,
also regarding the exposure to interest rate risk (BCBS, 2012). These principles are
broadly confirmed by the ECB guide to banking supervision (ECB, 2014). Addition-
ally, the design of banks’ surveys is typically aimed at gauging lending standards at
the consolidated level. This is the case, for example, of the Euro Area Bank Lending
Survey and the Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey run by the Eurosystem and by
the Federal Reserve System, respectively.
Third, our identification assumption is consistent with the literature on cross-
border banks as shock propagators. This literature shows that funding and liquidity
shocks to the holding of a cross-border banking group affect local lending supply
(Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2011; Schnabl, 2012; Ce´le´rier et al., 2018).
While it is reasonable to argue that lending policies are mainly driven by funding
and liquidity conditions of the banking group, we cannot exclude that local funding
or other factors may affect bank supply at the country level. For example, local
subsidiaries may experience a certain degree of flexibility, which would be subsumed
in our country demand factors. However, the fact that fund-raising and liquidity
conditions are prominent determinants of lending supply, as well as the fact that they
are mostly defined at the consolidated level, ensures that our identification strategy
is reliable.
More importantly, we cannot exclude that cross-border banks define local lending
policies taking into account the demand conditions that are specific to each country
in which they operate. For example, it could be the case that a bank is less willing
to extend ARMs in an economy characterised by high default rates (if it thinks that
granting ARMs would entail even higher default rates). Our methodology is not able
to isolate such component of lending supply that varies with borrowers characteris-
tics; nonetheless, it can effectively identify supply conditions driven by bank funding,
sometimes referred to as pure supply factors, which is the objective of our analysis.
In this respect, our analysis shares exactly the same advantages and limitations of
studies exploiting more granular data to control for credit demand conditions.13
13For example, if banks apply tighter lending criteria to small size borrowers, such extra tight-
ening is captured by borrowers-time fixed effects, which are typically meant to control for demand
conditions.
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4 Data
This paper uses the Individual Monetary and Financial Institution Interest Rates
(IMIR) dataset held by the Bank of Italy. This dataset includes monthly bank-
level information on a representative sample of seventy-three monetary and financial
institutions (MFIs),14 which we will henceforth simply call “banks”, acting in twelve
countries in the euro area. In particular our panel includes banks operating in Austria,
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain and the Netherlands. Data cover the period that goes from July 2007 to
December 2015. The available information encompasses the amount granted and a
weighted average of the interest rate applied to new mortgages. Overall, we have 103
banks associated to 73 banking groups. The latter include five cross-border banking
groups. Detailed information on our dataset is exposed in Table 2.
Figure 1 shows the average share of FRMs, the average spread between FRMs and
ARMs interest rates, and the term spread computed as the difference between the 10-
year Interest Rate Swap rate and the 3-month Overnight Index Swap rate. Looking at
the average share of FRMs, we find a substantial cross-country heterogeneity. We can
divide countries in two main groups. France, Germany and the Netherlands exhibit
a large proportion of FRMs over the entire time period of our analysis. All the other
countries exhibit more time variation and for most of them the average share looks
negatively related to the average spread. Looking at the spread between FRMs and
ARMs interest rates, some differences are observable as well, although for this metric
the heterogeneity seems contained. The time patterns of the average spread largely
reflect those of the slope of the term structure as measured by the term spread.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the share for domestic and foreign banks within
countries, for the two representative group of economies. The heterogeneity across
banks within (these groups of) countries is non negligible, but still much smaller than
what is observable across such (groups of) countries. In both groups of economies
foreign banks behave consistently with the domestic banks of the country in which
they operate. This evidence suggests that country factors may play a major role than
bank supply factors.
Table 3 reports basic statistics for the share of FRMs and the spread between
FRMs and ARMs interest rates for each country in our data set.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Baseline Model
Our methodology relies on the approach proposed by Amiti and Weinstein (2016),
although applied to our unique dataset, and exploits cross-border banking groups to
14According to the European Central Bank monetary and financial institutions are resident credit
institutions as defined in European Union law, and other resident financial institutions whose busi-
ness is to receive deposits and/or close substitutes for deposits from entities other than MFIs and,
for their own account (at least in economic terms), to grant credits and/or make investment in
securities.
14
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210730 
T
ab
le
2:
O
ve
rv
ie
w
of
B
an
k
s
an
d
B
an
k
in
g
G
ro
u
p
s,
b
y
C
ou
n
tr
y
B
an
k
s
w
it
h
a
d
om
es
ti
c
B
an
k
s
w
it
h
a
fo
re
ig
n
B
an
k
s
b
el
on
gi
n
g
to
a
D
om
es
ti
c
C
ro
ss
-b
or
d
er
C
ou
n
tr
y
b
an
k
h
ol
d
in
g
b
an
k
h
ol
d
in
g
cr
os
s-
b
or
d
er
b
an
k
in
g
gr
ou
p
b
an
k
in
g
gr
ou
p
s
b
an
k
in
g
gr
ou
p
s
G
er
m
an
y
35
1
5
26
1
It
al
y
16
2
3
12
1
F
ra
n
ce
13
0
4
2
3
S
p
ai
n
10
1
1
9
0
A
u
st
ri
a
3
1
1
3
0
S
lo
ve
n
ia
2
2
2
2
0
B
el
gi
u
m
3
1
1
3
0
G
re
ec
e
4
0
0
4
0
T
h
e
N
et
h
er
la
n
d
s
0
3
0
3
0
P
or
tu
ga
l
3
0
0
3
0
L
u
x
em
b
ou
rg
0
2
2
0
0
L
at
v
ia
1
0
0
1
0
T
ot
al
93
10
19
68
5
15
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210730 
Figure 1: Average share of FRMs (a), average spread between FRMs and ARMs
interest rates (b), term spread computed as the difference between the 10-year Interest
Rate Swap rate and the 3-month Overnight Index Swap rate (b).
(a) Average share of FRMs
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
A
ve
ra
ge
 S
ha
re
 (%
)
Jul, 2007 Jul, 2009 Jul, 2011 Jul, 2013 Jul, 2015
Date
AT BE
DE ES
FR GR
IT LU
LV NL
PT SI
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Figure 2: Share of FRMs of domestic banks and foreign banks for the first group (left)
and the second group (right) of countries. Domestic banks are banks with a domestic
bank holding. Foreign banks are banks with a foreign bank holding. The first group
includes France, Germany and the Netherlands. The second group includes Austria,
Belgium, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain. Q1 and
Q3 stand for first quartile and third quartile, respectively.
Share of FRMs 1st group (left) and share of FRMs 2nd group (right)
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decompose the share of FRMs into demand and supply components.15 More specifi-
cally, we estimate the following type of regression:
share(b, c, t) = α(c, t) + β(h(b), t) + ε(b, c, t) (1)
In equation 1 the share of FRMs extended by a given bank b operating in a given
country c at time t is regressed on a set of different fixed effects. The terms α(c, t)
represent month-country fixed effects. They consist in all observable and unobservable
time varying and time invariant characteristics of country c and, as such, they are
meant to capture the demand conditions prevailing in that economy. Obviously, no
other country specific controls can be added to the specification, as these would be
subsumed in the month-country fixed effects. This means that the inclusion of month-
country fixed effects in equation 1 is equivalent to the use of an arbitrarily large set
of country macroeconomic controls, which is why we argue that we are effectively
capturing country demand factors. Nonetheless, their limitation in this context is
related to the inability to control for demand conditions that are specific to individual
intermediaries. As most of our analysis focuses on cross-border banks, and since these
are typically large banks operating on a national scale and with a diversified set of
borrowers, we consider our approach appropriate. The terms β(h(b), t) represent
month-banking group fixed effects, h(b) denoting the holding of bank b. They consist
in all observable and unobservable time varying and time invariant characteristics of
15Greenstone et al. (2015) adopt a similar methodology, but they decompose the variation of their
dependent variable using time invariant rather than time varying fixed effects.
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banking group h and, as such, they are aimed at capturing bank supply conditions.
In light of the fact that lending policies are usually defined at the consolidated level
taking into account the financing conditions of the entire group, we argue that this
set of fixed effects reasonably accounts for bank supply factors.16
By construction, equation 1 can only be estimated in the subsample of observations
pertaining to cross-border banks. In this sample, equation 1 provides the upper limit
of the R2 that is achievable by regressing the share of FRMs on any set of variables
capturing (time varying) characteristics of the borrowing country c and (time varying)
characteristics of the lender h. Ideally, we would control for supply factors at the bank
level, as we cannot exclude the possibility that some of these intermediaries experience
some degree of autonomy (Houston et al., 1997). We investigate whether this is the
case by estimating alternative specifications to model 1 where we can say something
about the role of supply factors defined at the individual bank level. Of course this
comes at some cost, as it requires to abandon the use of time varying fixed effects. We
evaluate the size of costs associated with this approximation. Eventually, in order
to exploit the information available in the entire sample, we also explore simpler
specifications where the set of controls is less fine that what is implied in model 1.
5.2 Baseline Results
Models 1-3 of Table 4 report three specifications in which the share of FRMs is
regressed on, respectively, month-country fixed effects, month-banking group fixed
effects and both of these sets of fixed effects jointly. The latter is exactly the model
specified in equation 1. Month-country fixed effects explain a significant fraction
of the variation in the share (84%), suggesting a prominent role of demand factors.
When considered alone, month-banking group fixed effects also explain some of the
variation in the dependent variable (32%), but significantly less than month-country
fixed effects. If taken together these two sets of fixed effects can explain 91% of total
variation in the share. By decomposing the R2 of model 3 according to the Shorrocks-
Shapely approach, we find that the component of R2 related to month-country fixed
effects (72%) is considerably higher than the component related to month-banking
group fixed effects (19%), confirming that demand conditions play a prominent role.17
When saturating the previous specification by including also bank (time invariant)
fixed effects, as in model 4, we are able to explain almost the entire variation in the
dependent variable. Even if we interpret these dummies as (time invariant) supply
16Cross-border banks may sort themselves in countries that share similar characteristics. Even
within a country, they may specialize in lending to households that demand a certain type of mort-
gage. If this is the case, our banking-group fixed effects may capture demand rather than supply
factors. Nevertheless, the set of cross-border banks that we exploit in our regression analysis includes
big universal banks which operate in countries that show a significant difference in the prevalent
type of mortgage. Such big players are likely to operate on a national scale without specializing in
a specific type of mortgage.
17In the fixed-effect decomposition of model 3 we have 360 month-country dummies versus 393
month-banking group dummies. The two sets of fixed effects are well balanced, meaning that the re-
sults are not driven by a higher number of dummy variables for one of the two groups. Additionally,
147 out of 360 month-country dummies are omitted because of collinearity, while no month-banking
group dummy is omitted. Notwithstanding of that, month-country fixed effects have a higher ex-
planatory power than month-banking group fixed effects.
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factors at the bank level, we would still conclude that overall supply conditions explain
only a minor portion of the total variation in the share of FRMs.
Table 4: Baseline model. Fixed-effects decomposition of the share of FRMs. Sam-
ple: cross-border banking groups. Model: linear. Dependent variable: share of
FRMs. Standard errors: not adjusted. Shorrocks-Shapely decomposition of the R2
in model 3.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Month-country FE YES - YES YES
Month-banking group FE - YES YES YES
Bank FE - - - YES
N 1644 1644 1644 1644
R2 0.843 0.319 0.908 0.973
Adjusted R2 0.731 0.038 0.746 0.924
R2 month-country FE 0.716
R2 month-banking group FE 0.191
F-test statistic 7.493*** 1.137** 5.616*** 19.897***
degrees of freedom (688,956) (480,1164) (1046,598) (1057,587)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
One may be concerned whether the specific sample over which we are able to con-
duct our exercise, which is given by all observations (bank-month pairs) pertaining
to cross-border banking groups, is representative enough. As shown in Table 4, this
sample comprises 1644 observations, corresponding to about one fourth of the overall
sample. Moreover, it encompasses a rather homogenous set of lenders, typically the
largest players of the banking industry. As such, our analysis may underestimate the
relevance of supply factors as a determinant of mortgage choice. For instance, it could
be the case that large banks can more easily access financial markets to buy protection
against interest rate risk or to raise long-term funds at fixed rate via covered bonds.
If this is the case, focusing only on cross-border banks may lead to neglect part of
the role played by supply conditions. To tackle this issue we conduct an exercise that
requires a minor departure from our empirical setup. In particular, we consider time
invariant country fixed effects and banking group fixed effects to capture demand and
supply factors, respectively. In this way we are able to estimate similar regressions
to those in Table 4, but run on the entire sample. We start with the specification
shown in model 1 of Table 5 including only time dummies, which turn out to ex-
plain only a negligible portion of the total variation in the dependent variable (3%).
Broadly speaking, this suggests that, in our sample, the cross section is a much more
important dimension than the time series. Interestingly, by simply plugging country
fixed effects, the R2 raises to a surprising 70%. Model 3 displays instead the equation
where the share of FRMs is regressed just on the set of banking group fixed effects.
Despite the fact that these are largely collinear with the set of country fixed effects
and significantly more granular,18 the coefficient of determination, not only does not
18The two sets of fixed effects coincide in all observations related to banking groups operating only
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change, but actually slightly diminishes (69%) with respect to model 2. When we
combine country dummies and bank dummies, as in model 4, we are able to explain
almost 78% of the variation in the share. Using a Shorrocks-Shapely decomposition
of the R2, we find that country fixed effects exhibit a higher explanatory power than
banking group fixed effects. The same applies in the two corresponding specifications
also including month fixed effects, although, by construction, the R2 raises somewhat.
These considerations corroborate our conclusions drawn on the subsample of cross-
border banks, emphasizing the role played by demand factors. As a further exercise,
Table A1 in the Appendix shows the results of regressions including time invariant
fixed effects run on the subsample of cross-border banking groups. Again, the role of
time dummies is rather limited. Country fixed effects capture a sizable part of the
variation in the share of FRMs, while banking group fixed effects have a much smaller
explanatory power, as in Table 4.
5.3 Advanced Model
Regressions reported in previous tables provide a useful breakdown of the contribu-
tion of demand and supply factors in explaining the share of FRMs. This breakdown
is powerful, as it relies on reasonable identifying assumptions. However, its main
limitation is that it consists in a mere statistical decomposition, which prevents from
providing a meaningful economic interpretation. In particular, as discussed earlier,
our results suggest that demand factors play a prominent role, but these may include
a rather heterogeneous set of borrower-specific characteristics. The normative con-
clusions may be quite different depending on what is the actual driver. We tackle
this issue by adopting a hybrid approach. As in equation 1, we use month-banking
group fixed effects to control for supply conditions. However, instead of introducing
time varying country fixed effects to capture the demand, we directly model country-
specific factors by including a set of variables suggested in the existing literature plus
a novel variable. In particular, we consider the following variables: financial literacy,
indebtedness, gross disposable income per capita, historical volatility of inflation, cor-
relation between unemployment and the short-term interest rate, outstanding amount
of mortgage covered bonds to gross domestic product (GDP) and outstanding amount
of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) to GDP.
Our measure of Financial Literacy is obtained from the S&P Global FinLit Sur-
vey performed in 2014. The survey is based on interviews with more than 150000
adults in over 140 countries. It provides information on the degree of knowledge of
four basic concepts in finance: risk diversification, inflation, numeracy and interest
compounding. Financial literacy is measured as the percentage of 3 out of 4 answers
correctly given by adults interviewed in each country. Table 7 and Figure A1 in the
Appendix show that the level of financial education increases as we move from south-
ern countries to northern countries. Financial literacy may have two opposite effects
on the choice of FRMs versus ARMs. On the one hand, more educated borrowers
understand that, unconditionally, a FRM is more expensive than an ARM and, hence,
they are more likely to select an ARM (Agarwal et al., 2010; Gathergood and Weber,
in one country, which represent the vast majority of the sample. Moreover, the dataset includes 73
banking groups as opposed to only 12 countries.
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2017). On the other hand, these educated borrowers may be more willing to choose
a FRM, as they are aware of the risks related to the uncertain stream of payments of
an ARM (Fornero et al., 2011).
To measure households’ Indebtedness we use the ratio of total outstanding debt
as percentage of gross disposable income provided by the OECD on a quarterly fre-
quency. Table 7 and Figure A1 in the Appendix displays important differences in the
level of households’ indebtedness across countries. We consider the indebtedness ra-
tio as a suitable proxy for households’ income risk bearing capacity over the duration
of the mortgage. Consistently with Campbell and Cocco (2003) and Fornero et al.
(2011), we expect this ratio to have a positive effect on the share of FRMs.
As a measure of Real Disposable Income Per Capita we use the gross disposable in-
come (adjusted for social transfers in kind) of households (and non-profit institutions
serving households) expressed in purchasing power standard (PPS) per inhabitant,
obtained from Eurostat on an annual basis. Table 7 and Figure A1 in the Appendix
show a marked heterogeneity in households’ real disposable income across countries
over our sample period. The effect of disposable income on mortgage choice is rather
ambiguous. It can capture either a current costs minimization effect (Campbell and
Cocco, 2003), or an income risk bearing capacity effect (Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer,
2017). If the first is prevalent, households with low income are more likely to select
an ARM in order to minimize the current payment required by the loan. On the con-
trary, if the latter dominates, borrowers with low income are more prone to choose a
FRM, because they may be concerned of not being able to face the future stream of
payments required from an adjustable rate loan.
It is recognized in the literature that the unemployment rate plays a role in mort-
gage choice as well. For example, Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2017) include among
demand conditions the unemployment rate and its volatility, mainly as proxy for cur-
rent and expected income. We believe that the unemployment rate is an important
country demand factor, but we are aware that it may have opposite effects depending
on whether households are mainly focused on current costs minimization or future
income risk reduction.
A related aspect which has not been emphasized so far is that borrowers choosing
between FRMs and ARMs should care, not only about the expected evolution in labor
market conditions, but also about how unemployment will correlate with the level of
interest rates. Risk-averse households expecting to be unemployed in a context of low
interest rates tend to prefer, everything else equal, an ARM, as this implies a higher
degree of consumption smoothing (mortgage installments decrease when income goes
down and vice versa). Guren et al. (2017) provide a theoretical support for this
argument. Usually a crisis unfolds because of a aggregate shock to the demand,
leading to a drop in income and inflation. In such situation interest rates decrease,
due to a possible decrease in expected inflation and especially to the monetary policy
reaction of the central bank. Guren et al. (2017) show that, if the central bank
reduces interest rates in response to a aggregate shock, households should select an
ARM rather than a FRM. If, instead, interest rates increase during a downturn, for
example because of a aggregate shock to the supply, households should prefer a FRM.
In light of that, the correlation between interest rates and unemployment depends
on different factors including the slope of the Phillips curve and the monetary policy
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rule adopted. A full discussion of these aspects is clearly outside the scope of this
paper. Here we limit ourselves to highlight that whenever such correlation is neg-
ative, the mortgage contract providing more protection against income fluctuations
is, somewhat counterintuitively, the ARM and the insurance motive attached to it is
stronger the smaller the correlation. We postulate that households make their expec-
tations looking at the past. Then, to capture this effect we introduce a novel variable,
namely the correlation between unemployment and the short-term interest rate.
We calculate ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR) as the realized correlation between
the unemployment rate and a short-term interest rate,19 relying on a rolling window
approach with a window of 7 years. We opt for a window of 7 years for two rea-
sons: First, we assume that households make long-term expectations;20 second, we
make sure that, at the beginning of our sample period in 2007, we measure the cor-
relation between these two variables after the introduction of the euro.21 Table 7
and Figure A2 in the Appendix show that the correlation between unemployment
and the short-term interest rate is negative in most countries over our sample pe-
riod. This suggests that in periods of economic growth unemployment is low and
the short-term interest rate is high as a result of a tight monetary policy aimed at
containing inflation. Conversely, in bad times, as the recent double-dip European
recession, unemployment is high and the short-term interest rate is low due to an
expansionary monetary policy. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions. For example
Germany exhibits a positive correlation from the end of 2010. The reason is that in
2009 the unemployment rate in Germany started to decrease, revealing a substantial
improvement in economic fundamentals.22
We include as an indicator of the macroeconomic history of a country the volatil-
ity of the inflation rate over a period of 30 years prior to the introduction of the
euro. We calculate Historical Inflation Volatility as the realized standard deviation
of the monthly month-on-month inflation rate during the period 1970-1999 expressed
in percentage points.23 As in Campbell (2012), we estimate our measure on a pre-euro
period in order to emphasize differences across countries. In Table 7 and Figure A1
in the Appendix we see that the periphery economies of the eurozone have experi-
enced a substantial higher inflation volatility than central countries. High volatility
19Data on short-term interest rates are retrieved from the OECD. For euro area countries the
3-month European Interbank Offer Rate is used from the date the country joined the euro. For the
other countries the short-term interest rate is either the 3-month interbank offer rate or the yield on
short-term Treasury bills, Certificates of Deposits or similar instruments with a maturity of three
months.
20Usually long-term expectations have an horizon of at least five years (ECB, 2016, 2017).
21In this way we ensure that households expectations are made taking into account that monetary
policy is defined by the ECB for the entire euro area. This clearly implies that we estimate the
correlation between unemployment and short term interest rate having the same short-term interest
rate for all countries (with the only exception of Greece, Latvia and Slovenia before their access to
the euro area respectively in 2001, 2014 and 2007).
22This reflects, in turn, a flight-to-quality episode in the context of a monetary union. When
economic conditions worsens due, as for example in the recent past, to a global financial crisis, policy
rates go down to the same extent for every economy in the monetary union, but flight to quality
makes unemployment raise more in peripheral countries. This also can explain why Germany is an
outlier.
23Because of a lack in the available data, the historical volatility of inflation is computed over the
period 1991-1999 for Latvia and 1980-1999 for Slovenia.
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of inflation is related to a higher share of ARMs. In order to understand why, the
following considerations can be made. As mentioned above, when the correlation
between unemployment and the short-term interest rate is negative, ARMs provide
higher protection to borrowers. Economies where mortgages are predominantly at
adjustable rate tend to be characterized by both a higher historical volatility of infla-
tion and a larger, in magnitude, (negative) correlation between unemployment and
the short-term interest rate, at least if compared to Germany (Table 7 and Figure A2
in the Appendix). Therefore, in these economies, the insurance provided by an ARM
tends to be large and both factors, high inflation risk and a large, in magnitude,
(negative) unemployment-interest rate correlation, contribute to it. Alternatively,
Campbell (2012) and Badarinza et al. (2017) point out that a high volatility of infla-
tion leads banks to set the interest rate on fixed rate loans at a relatively high level
to protect them from inflation risk.24 As a consequence, households are less willing
to select a FRM. The fact that countries with a history of high inflation volatility
still exhibit a prevalence of ARMs even after the introduction of the euro can only be
interpreted as evidence of a sticky demand, suggesting that households tend to select
the type of mortgage they are more familiar with (Campbell, 2012; Badarinza et al.,
2017).
We label the variables listed so far as pure demand factors, as they relate to
strictly specific households’ characteristics. We take into account also two additional
variables, namely Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to
GDP. These are aimed to capture borrowers’ characteristics that make mortgages ex-
tended locally suitable to back covered bonds or asset-backed securities. In principle
these variables could capture both demand and supply factors. On the one hand,
they can capture the reliance of banks on such funding instruments, highlighting an
effect on the supply of FRMs. On the other hand, they can capture the eligibility of
a mortgage issued locally to be used to secure covered bonds and mortgage-backed
securities, assessing an effect on the demand of FRMs.25 Nevertheless, in our analy-
sis these variables are mainly used to explain the demand, as supply conditions are
captured by time-varying banking group fixed effects. We retrieve annual data on
outstanding covered bonds from the European Covered Bond Council (ECBC). Our
variable is the average over the last four years of the outstanding amount of mortgage
covered bonds issued in a given country as percentage of GDP. Table 7 and Figure A2
in the Appendix show that mortgage covered bonds are particularly popular in Por-
tugal and Spain. As for residential mortgage-backed securities, we get quarterly data
from the Securities Industries and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). Our vari-
able is the average over the last four quarters of the outstanding amount of RMBS
by country of collateral scaled by GDP. Table 7 and Figure A2 in the Appendix show
that RMBS are common in the Netherlands and Portugal. Table 6 summarizes all the
explanatory variables that we use to model country-specific factors, whilst Table 7
reports basic statistics.
Table 8 displays the estimates of the regressions including country specific ex-
24In particular, high inflation volatility entails a high cost of the prepayment option embedded in
the interest rate charged on a FRM.
25For example, covered bonds regulations in most European countries specify that only mortgages
having a loan-to-value below a certain threshold are eligible to be used as collateral for covered
bonds (ECBC Covered Bond Comparative Database; ECB, 2008; ECBC, 2016).
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Table 6: Description of Country Demand Variables
Variable Description
Financial Literacy
Percentage of 3 out of 4 answers correct given by adults
interviewed in each country, as results from the S&P
Global FinLit Survey.
Indebtedness
Ratio of total outstanding debt as percentage of gross
disposable income provided by the OECD on a quarterly
frequency. Data are missing for Latvia and Luxembourg,
and partially available for Greece, Italy and
the Netherlands.
Real Disposable Income Per Capita
Gross disposable income (adjusted for social transfers in
kind) of households (and non-profit institutions serving
households) expressed in purchasing power standard
(PPS) per inhabitant, obtained from Eurostat on an annual
basis. Data are missing for Luxembourg.
Historical Inflation Volatility
Realized standard deviation of the monthly month-on-
month inflation rate during the period 1970-1999.
Because of a lack in the available data, Historical Inflation
Volatility is computed over the period 1991-1999 for
Latvia and 1980-1999 for Slovenia. Monthly data on the
inflation rate are retrieved from the OECD.
ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR)
Realized correlation between the unemployment rate
and the short-term interest rate, calculated on
a rolling window approach with a window of 7 years.
Monthly data on unemployment rates and short-term
interest rates are retrieved from the OECD.
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP
Average over the last four years of the amount
outstanding of mortgage covered bonds as percentage of
GDP. Annual data on outstanding covered bonds are
retrieved from the European Covered Bond Council
(ECBC). Data are missing for Slovenia.
Outstanding RMBS to GDP
Average over the last four quarters of the amount
outstanding of RMBS as percentage of GDP. Quarterly
data on outstanding residential mortgage-backed
securities are retrieved from the Securities Industries and
Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). Data are missing
for Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia and not available for
all other countries in 2007.
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planatory variables and month-banking group fixed effects. In order to make sure
that our regressors are predetermined, we include lagged values for those variables
that are available on a lower frequency than monthly.26 Given the different nature
of the two groups of variables that we take into account, we first consider those cap-
turing pure demand only and then integrate with the other country demand factors.
Model 1 shows the results for the specification including pure demand factors only.
We find a negative and significant coefficient for Real Disposable Income Per Capita
in line with Ehrmann and Ziegelmeyer (2017). They interpret this finding with the
view that households with higher income are more prone to select an adjustable rate
loan, as they can comfortably face the income risk related to the uncertain stream
of payments of an ARM. At the same time, and unlike what will be documented for
Historical Inflation Volatility and ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR), this finding is
not robust to alternative specifications and should be considered with caution.
We find a negative and significant coefficient for the Historical Inflation Volatility,
which confirms our priors. Our result is consistent with that of Campbell (2012) and
Badarinza et al. (2017), showing that households’ are more likely to select the type
of loan they are more used to. An alternative explanation is that higher inflation
risk entails a higher insurance motive attached to an ARM. As expected, the sign
of the coefficients for Financial Literacy, Indebtedness and ρ(Unemployment, Short-
term IR) are, respectively, negative, positive and positive, but neither of the three is
statistically significant.
In model 2 we extend the previous specification by adding the two additional
demand factors: Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to
GDP. The sign and statistical significance of the pure demand regressors remains
unchanged if compared to model 1, with the exception of ρ(Unemployment, Short-
term IR).
The coefficient of ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR) turns out to be positive and
statistically significant, corroborating our view that the smaller such correlation, the
stronger the insurance protection provided by an ARM. This suggests that house-
holds actually make expectations on what would be the macroeconomic environment
in which a labor shock may occur. In particular, households that expect to be un-
employed in a context of low interest rates are more willing to select an ARM, while
households that envisage to be unemployed in a context of high interest rates, are
more prone to choose a FRM. This result confirms the theoretical prediction of Guren
et al. (2017).
The coefficients of the two additional variables are positive, but they result not
to be statistically significant. To have a reliable basis for inference, both in model 1
and in model 2, we rely on standard errors clustered by country and quarter.27 To
tackle the issue that we may have few clusters, we adopt a small-sample correction for
both standard errors and test statistics, as suggested by Cameron et al. (2011), and
26These are all the explanatory variables except for ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR).
27In Table A3 in the Appendix we show the evidence that lead us to adopt this type of clustering.
By clustering at progressively higher levels in the two dimensions of our panel, we detect a substantial
serial correlation and a less pronounced, but not negligible, cross correlation. This is why we decide
to cluster at both the country and the quarter level. These two levels of clustering have been selected
according to the procedure suggested by Petersen (2009), Cameron et al. (2011), and Cameron and
Miller (2015).
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Cameron and Miller (2015). With such severe double clustering, Financial Literacy,
Indebtedness and Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP are not statistically signifi-
cant.28 However, most of them will recover significance in an alternative specification
that overcomes the possible biases arising in this context, where we try to explain
country demand factors relying on a sample with a heterogeneous coverage of banks
across countries (analysis presented below).
In this type of exercise, we effectively control for bank supply conditions, but we
cannot be entirely sure to capture at all country demand factors. We have relied on
an exhaustive survey of existing papers in order to select a complete set of explana-
tory variables and we have actually enhanced it by introducing an additional (and
novel) variable, i.e., ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR). Nonetheless, we are aware
that additional or alternative measures could be relevant in this setup. In order to
assess whether our selection is reliable and comprehensive enough, we compare the
quality of the fit obtained with the specification in model 2 with that obtained by
replacing the explanatory variables with month-country fixed effects, but run on the
sample used in model 2.29 As shown in model 3, the latter amounts to 85% and
represents the upper bound that can be reachable by including any arbitrarily large
set of country-specific variables. The R2 obtained by simply using our selection of
seven regressors results to be quite close (79%).
Finally, Table A3 in the Appendix displays the results when adopting all possible
alternative choices for double clustering of standard errors. Results are virtually
unchanged.
5.4 Two-Stage Model
The results exposed so far provide useful insights on the determinants of the wide
cross-country heterogeneity in the share of FRMs. Our findings suggest a prominent
role for country demand factors, with a special emphasis on Real Disposable Income
Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility and ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR). Nev-
ertheless, our sample is characterized by important differences in the number of banks
operating in each country. As a consequence, we may wonder whether these results
fully explain the mechanism behind the heterogeneity across countries, or rather they
are driven by those countries that are more represented in our sample. In order
to guarantee that we draw conclusions giving an equal weight to the observations
pertaining to each country, we adopt a two stage approach, as in Ongena and Smith
(2000). In particular, we regress the estimated coefficients of the month-country fixed
effects in the full specification of equation 1 on our set of explanatory variables.30 Un-
fortunately, 147 out of 393 month-country dummies in model 3 of Table 4 are omitted
28Table A2 in the Appendix shows that these variables are statistically significant when standard
errors are not adjusted.
29Model 3 of Table 8 is equivalent to model 3 of Table 4, with the only difference that, in the
former, the regression is run over a smaller sample to make it comparable to model 2 of Table 8.
This is necessary because some of the regressors in model 2 of Table 8 are not available over some
time periods.
30To perform the second stage regression we only need that the estimated coefficients of the month-
county fixed effects are unbiased. We argue that this condition is satisfied as the time varying country
fixed effects and banking group fixed effects included in the first stage regression span all the possible
factors determining the dependent variable.
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Table 8: Advanced model. Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model: linear.
Dependent variable: share of FRMs. Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy,
Indebtedness, Real Disposable Income Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility,
ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR), Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Out-
standing RMBS to GDP. Standard errors: two-way clustered by country and quarter
for model 1-2, not adjusted for model 3.
(1) (2) (3)
Financial Literacy -0.509 -1.689
(1.84) (1.47)
Indebtedness 0.835 0.602
(0.48) (0.55)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.014*** -0.012**
(0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility -5.221*** -5.799***
(1.14) (0.68)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 20.473 24.170**
(11.23) (8.18)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 1.430
(1.31)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP 0.319
(0.88)
Month-banking group FE YES YES YES
Month-country FE - - YES
Two-way cluster country, quarter country, quarter -
N 1085 1085 1085
R2 0.785 0.789 0.852
Adjusted R2 0.677 0.682 0.666
F-test statistic regressors 276.015*** -
degrees of freedom (5,5) -
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 158.955***
degrees of freedom (5,5)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 1.829
degrees of freedom (2,5)
F-test statistic fixed effects 4.572***
degrees of freedom (606,479)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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because of collinearity. As a consequence, performing the second stage regression with
only 246 dependent variables would prevent us to get reliable results. To circumvent
this issue, we estimate a similar regression to the one of equation 1, in which we sub-
stitute month-banking group fixed effects with quarter-banking group fixed effects.
In this way, we are able to estimate 344 out of 393 month-country dummies and to
perform the second stage regression accordingly. To be more specific, our two-stage
regression looks as follows:
share(b, c, t) = α(c, t) + β(h(b), t) + ε(b, c, t) (2)
αˆ(c, t) = x′(c, t)γ + υ(c, t) (3)
The terms β(h(b), t) represent quarter-banking group fixed effects, while x′(c, t) de-
notes the vector of explanatory variables capturing demand conditions.
Table 9 reports the results of the first stage and the second stage regressions.
Model 1 consists in the regression in which we include month-country fixed effects
and quarter-banking group fixed effects. To check if by substituting month-country
fixed effects with our seven regressors we alter the findings exposed in Table 8, we
include model 2 and everything remains virtually unchanged. In models 3-4, the co-
efficients of month-country fixed effects estimated by running model 1 are regressed
over the set of explanatory variables capturing demand conditions. Model 3 includes
pure demand factors only. As before, we find a negative and significant coefficient
for Historical Inflation Volatility. Model 4 extends the preceding including all set of
regressors. Historical Inflation Volatility maintains its sign and significance. Simi-
larly to Table 8, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR) exhibits a positive and significant
coefficient. As for the other variables, we detect important differences with respect
to model 2 of Table 8. The coefficients of Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and
Outstanding RMBS to GDP are both positive and significant, suggesting that these
country demand factors actually matter. In countries where the characteristics of
borrowers ease the issuance of covered bonds and asset-backed securities FRMs are
relatively more appealing. Statistically significant is also the coefficient of Financial
Literacy. The negative sign implies that financially educated households are more
willing to select an ARM, as they are able to understand that, unconditionally, an
ARM is cheaper than a FRM. In contrast to previous results, Real Disposable In-
come Per Capita loses its significance. Tables A4-A5 in the Appendix report the
results of models 2-4 when adopting all possible alternative choices for double clus-
tering of standard errors. Results are virtually unchanged. Table A6 displays similar
findings when the share of FRMs is decomposed in month-country fixed effects and
year-banking group fixed effects.
To obtain relevant normative insights, we do not limit ourselves to merely iden-
tifying the country demand factors that play a role in mortgage choice, but we also
provide an economic assessment of their magnitude. Table 10 reports the magnitude
effects of the seven variables included in model 4 of Table 9. Focusing the attention on
those that are statistically significant, we find that the Historical Inflation Volatility
exhibits the strongest effect. One standard deviation increase leads to a decrease of 59
percentage points in the average share of FRMs per country cleaned of variation due
to bank supply factors. Sizable is also the effect of Financial Literacy. A rise of one
standard deviation corresponds to a drop of 42 percentage points in the average share
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Table 9: Two-stage model. First stage regressions including: month-country fixed
effects and quarter-banking group fixed effects (1), all explanatory variables and
quarter-banking group fixed effects (2). In the first stage regressions the dependent
variable is the share of FRMs. Second stage regressions of the estimated coefficients
of month-country fixed effects in (1) on: pure demand explanatory variables (3) and
all explanatory variables (4). Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model: linear.
Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy, Indebtedness, Real Disposable Income Per
Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR), Outstand-
ing Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to GDP. Standard errors: not
adjusted for model 1, two-way clustered by country and quarter for model 2-4.
1ST STAGE 2ND STAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy -1.634 -2.693 -5.386**
(1.37) (2.26) (1.72)
Indebtedness 0.586 1.558 0.206
(0.54) (0.99) (0.78)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.012** 0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility -5.772*** -3.847** -6.482***
(0.69) (1.48) (0.87)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 23.764** 33.128 28.726**
(7.87) (18.53) (9.79)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 1.436 5.754***
(1.24) (0.80)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP 0.314 2.756***
(0.82) (0.50)
Quarter-banking group FE YES YES
Month-country FE YES -
Two-way cluster - country, quarter country, quarter country, quarter
N 1085 1085 344 344
R2 0.847 0.779 0.337 0.503
Adjusted R2 0.733 0.750 0.327 0.492
F-test statistic regressors - - -
degrees of freedom - - -
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 129.047*** 53.302***
degrees of freedom (5,5) (5,5)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 1.957 27.071***
degrees of freedom (2,5) (2,5)
F-test statistic fixed effects 7.437***
degrees of freedom (464,621)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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of FRMs per country ascribable to demand factors. Moreover, a one standard devi-
ation increase in Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and in Outstanding RMBS to
GDP determines a rise, respectively, of 32 and 17 percentage points in the dependent
variable. Finally, a one standard deviation increase in ρ(Unemployment, Short-term
IR) leads to a rise of 14 percentage points in the average share of FRMs per country
left unexplained by bank supply factors.
5.5 Time Variation
Some useful indications can be obtained by exploring more closely the variation across
time of the share of FRMs. As noted in Figure 1, for those countries in which the
share of FRMs changes over time, the variability seems to be related to the spread
between FRMs and ARMs interest rates. Since the term spread is a component of the
spread between the interest rate applied on fixed rate and adjustable rate loans, the
time variation in the share is related to the term spread as well. We aim to investigate
whether the sensitivity of the share of FRMs to the term spread is mainly driven by
the demand or the supply. To this end we perform the following type of regression:
share(b, c, t) =α(c) + α(c)× tspread(t)
+ β(h(b)) + β(h(b))× tspread(t) + ε(b, c, t) (4)
The terms α(c) represent country fixed effects, β(h(b)) denotes banking group fixed
effects and tspread(t) is the term spread at time t.
In this model, country fixed effects and banking group fixed effects capture the
average level of the share for each country and each banking group. Their interactions
with the term spread capture, instead, the sensitivity (slope) of each country and each
banking group to changes in the term spread. This regression allows us to model the
time variation in the share of FRMs using the term spread and assuming that the
relation between these two is linear. As before, to disentangle shifts in demand from
shifts in supply, we focus the attention on cross-border banking groups.
It is important to stress that, differently from other studies, we regress the share
of FRMs on the term spread rather than the spread between FRMs and ARMs inter-
est rates, as we want to draw causal inference. While the former can be considered
to a large extent exogenous, the latter is inherently endogenous. Indeed, the spread
between FRMs and ARMs interest rates is simultaneously determined with the quan-
tities of FRMs and ARMs extended in equilibrium.
In estimating this model we use the term spread computed at the European level as
the difference between the 10-year Interest Rate Swap rate and the 3-month Overnight
Index Swap rate. We adopt this measure for the slope of the yield curve rather than
the term spread for each country obtained on the basis of the respective government
bonds. The reason is that, especially for those country that were more affected by
the sovereign debt crisis, the interest rate charged on FRMs is more closely related
to the 10-year Interest Rate Swap rate rather than the yield on 10-year government
bonds. This can be explained by the fact that, during most of the time period under
analysis, sovereign default risk in several countries was sensibly higher than credit
risk associated with local mortgages.
33
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210730 
T
ab
le
10
:
M
ag
n
it
u
d
e
eff
ec
ts
of
th
e
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
s
ca
p
tu
ri
n
g
d
em
an
d
co
n
d
it
io
n
s
in
m
o
d
el
4
of
T
ab
le
9.
In
th
e
th
ir
d
co
lu
m
n
th
e
m
ag
n
it
u
d
e
eff
ec
t
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
as
th
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
co
effi
ci
en
t
an
d
th
e
st
an
d
ar
d
d
ev
ia
ti
on
of
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
.
In
th
e
la
st
co
lu
m
n
th
e
m
ag
n
it
u
d
e
eff
ec
t
is
co
m
p
u
te
d
as
th
e
p
ro
d
u
ct
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
co
effi
ci
en
t
an
d
th
e
in
te
rq
u
ar
ti
le
ra
n
ge
of
th
e
co
rr
es
p
on
d
in
g
ex
p
la
n
at
or
y
va
ri
ab
le
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
M
a
g
n
it
u
d
e
In
te
rq
u
a
rt
il
e
M
a
g
n
it
u
d
e
V
a
ri
a
b
le
C
o
e
ffi
ci
e
n
ts
d
e
v
ia
ti
o
n
e
ff
e
ct
(s
d
)
ra
n
g
e
e
ff
e
ct
(i
r)
F
in
an
ci
al
L
it
er
ac
y
-5
.3
86
**
7.
83
7
-4
2.
21
3
3.
00
0
-1
6.
15
9
In
d
eb
te
d
n
es
s
0.
20
6
11
.0
97
2.
29
1
12
.8
70
2.
65
7
R
ea
l
D
is
p
os
ab
le
In
co
m
e
P
er
C
ap
it
a
0.
00
2
22
15
.5
40
4.
38
6
32
60
.0
00
6.
45
3
H
is
to
ri
ca
l
In
fl
at
io
n
V
ol
at
il
it
y
-6
.4
82
**
*
9.
06
4
-5
8.
75
8
6.
30
5
-4
0.
87
2
ρ
(U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t,
S
h
or
t-
te
rm
IR
)
28
.7
26
**
0.
49
1
14
.1
11
0.
43
9
12
.6
08
O
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
C
ov
er
ed
B
on
d
s
to
G
D
P
5.
75
4*
**
5.
53
5
31
.8
54
7.
24
6
41
.6
99
O
u
ts
ta
n
d
in
g
R
M
B
S
to
G
D
P
2.
75
6*
**
6.
33
0
17
.4
45
9.
65
2
26
.6
03
34
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3210730 
Table 11 reports six different specifications. Model 1 includes country fixed effects
only, while model 4 includes both country fixed effects and their interaction with the
term spread. Country fixed effects explain alone 58% of the variation in the share of
FRMs. When we add the interaction of country fixed effects with the term spread
the coefficient of determination rises to 66%. This value is quite far from the 84%
achieved in our baseline model with month-country fixed effects. However, while in
the baseline model we allow country fixed effects to vary in a discretionary way over
time, in model 4 we constrain the share of fixed rate mortgages to evolve linearly with
the term spread. Of course, since the share is bounded between 0 and 100, it is likely
that this relation is not linear. In fact, if we add an additional interaction term with
the term spread squared, we experience an increase in the R2 (71%). So, we conclude
that the term spread is able to explain the time variation in the share of FRMs and
that the relation between these two is not perfectly linear. A similar argument applies
also to the two specifications with banking group fixed effects, namely model 2 and
model 5.
Consistently with the evidence in Figure 1, we find that most of the coefficients
of the interaction terms in model 4 are negative and significant. However, the sensi-
tivity of the share of FRMs to the term spread differs significantly across countries.
In particular, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia are those countries
where the share of FRMs is more reactive to changes in the term spread.
We have already pointed out that changes in the term spread can shift both the
demand and the supply. On the one hand, an increase in the term spread, driven by
an increase in inflation risk, may lead banks to decrease the supply of fixed rate loans,
by making them relatively more expensive than adjustable rate ones. On the other
hand, a rise in the spread between FRMs and ARMs interest rates due to an increase
in the term spread may induce households to reduce their demand for fixed rate loans,
which could signal either some form of myopic behavior (households choose ARMs
when the term spread is high because they tend to give too much importance to
the first installments), as well as the presence of financial constraints (matched with
expectations of an increase in income). To assess whether the demand or the supply
is more sensitive to changes in the slope of the yield curve, we include a specification
in which we interact both country fixed effects and banking group fixed effects with
the term spread. Relying on the Shorrocks-Shapely decomposition, we are able to
detect the contribution of each interaction to the R2. Model 6 shows that the fraction
of R2 ascribable to the interaction between country fixed effects and the term spread
is much higher than the fraction attributable to the other interaction. Thus, we
conclude that changes in the slope of the yield curve shift mainly the demand.
6 Tobit Robustness Checks
The results exposed so far are obtained using linear regressions. Our dependent
variable, the share of FRMs, is a percentage bounded between 0 and 100. Using a
linear model in this setting leads to inconsistent estimates. For this reason, it should
be more appropriate to use a censored Tobit model of the form:
y∗ = xβ + ε (5)
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y =

0 if y∗ < 0
y∗ if 0 ≤ y∗ ≤ 100
100 if y∗ > 100
Nonetheless, most of our findings are drawn by comparing the coefficients of deter-
mination of different specifications. Unfortunately, Tobit models do not provide such
measure. Alternative metrics known as pseudo-R2 cannot be considered as meaningful
as the coefficient of determination of linear models. Moreover, in the specifications
where we model the demand relying on a set of explanatory variables, we control
for bank supply conditions including month-banking group fixed effects. It is well
known that nonlinear models with fixed effects suffer from the so called “incidental
parameters problem” (Neyman and Scott, 1948; Lancaster, 2000). This implies that
the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is inconsistent. Greene (2004a,b) shows
that, for the specific case of Tobit models with fixed effects, the slope coefficients are
slightly affected by the incidental parameters problem. However, the bias can be siz-
able for the disturbance variance, with clear implications also on the estimation of the
marginal effects. Therefore, either using linear or nonlinear models, we have to deal
with relevant issues that can produce unreliable results. In light of the fact that our
sample includes only four observations where the share of FRMs is exactly equal to
one of the two bounds,31 we believe that the issue related to linear regression models
is less severe and, hence, we rely on them to derive our main results. Nonetheless,
we perform a set of Tobit robustness checks in order to test whether our findings are
robust to nonlinear specifications.
We start by replicating Table 4 using a censored regression model with lower bound
0 and upper bound 100. We calculate the pseudo R2 according to the methodology
suggested in Wooldridge (2010). In particular, we computed it as the square of the
correlation coefficient between the dependent variable and the estimate of E [y |x] .
Table A7 in the Appendix shows that, as before, month-country fixed effects explain
a larger fraction of the variation in the dependent variable than month-banking group
fixed effects. We extend our analysis also including Tobit models with lower bound
1 and upper bound 99, in order to check whether our findings are affected by a more
restrictive censoring. Results are virtually unchanged.
Tables A8-A9 in the Appendix replicate Table 5. In both tables the pattern of
the R2 across the different specifications is equal to the one displayed in Table 5.
This confirms the prominent role of country demand factors, even when considering
the whole sample of banks. However, in this setting we are not able to perform a
decomposition of the R2 to get additional insights.
Table A10 in the Appendix shows the estimates of the censored regression models
including country specific explanatory variables and month-banking group fixed ef-
fects. For each regressor we report the marginal effect of the censored variable E [y |x]
at the sample means. Differently from Table 8, we cluster standard errors only by
country, as the statistical software that we use does not allow to implement two-way
clustering in the Tobit model that we employ. We consider this a minor limitation, as
we detected a higher serial correlation than cross correlation in our data set. In the
specifications with the full set of country variables, we find, as before, a negative and
31In these four observations the value of the share is equal to the upper bound 100.
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statistically significant coefficient for Real Disposable Income Per Capita and Histor-
ical Inflation Volatility, as well as a positive and statistically significant coefficient for
ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR).
As in the previous section, we improve our analysis making sure that we equally
weight each country when explaining the cross-country heterogeneity in the share
of FRMs. To this aim, we rely on a two-stage approach. In the first stage we per-
form a censored regression including month-country fixed effects and quarter-banking
group fixed effects. In the second stage we regress the estimated coefficients of the
month-country fixed effects, which correspond to the marginal effects of the latent
variable y∗, on our set of explanatory variables. While in the first stage we use a
Tobit model, in the second stage we employ a linear regression, as the dependent
variable is not constrained between 0 and 100. Model 4 of Tables A11-A12 in the
Appendix show, as in Table 9, a negative and significant coefficient for Financial
Literacy and Historical Inflation Volatility, as well as a positive and significant co-
efficient for ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR), Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP
and Outstanding RMBS to GDP.
Finally, in Table A13 in the Appendix we investigate the time variation in the
share of FRMs using censored regression models. As in Table 11, we find that, the
sensitivity of the share of FRMs to the term spread is quite heterogeneous across
countries. Moreover, the term spread captures an important fraction of the time
variation in the dependent variable.
The Tobit robustness checks exposed above highlight that the results obtained
using linear regression models are indeed robust to nonlinear specifications.
7 Empirical Analysis on the Spread
The quantity of FRMs and ARMs, as well as their interest rates, are simultaneously
determined on the market by the interaction between demand and supply. No bank
should be able to individually set the share of FRMs granted neither the price of
FRMs and ARMs. If this is the case, the variation in the spread between FRMs and
ARMs interest rates should be explained by the same factors driving the share of
FRMs. We want to explore this possibility by performing the same set of reduced-
form regressions exposed in section 5 using this time as dependent variable the spread
between FRMs and ARMs interest rates, henceforth abridged simply with “spread”.
Models 1-3 of Table A14 in the Appendix displays three specifications in which
the spread is regressed on, respectively, month-country fixed effects, month-banking
group fixed effects and both sets of fixed effects jointly. Month-country fixed effects
alone explain 60% of the variation in the spread, suggesting that, also in this case,
country demand factors play a major role. Month-banking group fixed effects explain
only 38% of the variation in the dependent variable, but the difference between the
R2 of model 1 and model 2 is smaller compared to what seen for the share of FRMs
in Table 4. When taken together the two sets of fixed effects can explain 73% of
the total variation in the spread. We conclude that also the spread is mainly driven
by the demand, although here our model is somewhat less capable of describing the
data. The supply plays a role as well and it seems to be slightly more relevant in
explaining the spread than the share of FRMs.
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The following step is to model month-country fixed effects with the selection of
regressors that we used in section 5. We expect that these explanatory variables
have an effect also on the spread, but the relation should be of opposite sign with
respect to the one observed in the analysis on the share of FRMs. To avoid possible
distortions related to heterogeneous coverage of the dataset across countries (in terms
of number of intermediaries) we directly look at the two-stage approach, as described
above for quantities. Model 1 of Table A15 in the Appendix consists in the regression
with month-country fixed effects and year-banking group fixed effects. We report
the results of this specification including year-banking group fixed effects, instead
of quarter-banking group fixed effects, because the results are not exactly the same
under the two models. In light of that, we consider the specification with year-banking
group fixed effects more reliable, as it allows us to perform the second stage regression
having 381 out of 393 estimated coefficients of month-country fixed effects. As shown
in model 4 of Table A15 in the Appendix, two factors turn out to be significant,
at least when a two-way cluster by country and quarter is adopted, both with the
expected sign: the ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR) and the Outstanding RMBS to
GDP. In general, the coefficients of all the explanatory variables are very little and
sensibly lower than those displayed in Table 9. The weak effects of our regressors are
hardly surprising though. In fact, as highlighted before, the cross-country variation
in the spread is much lower than the variation in the share of FRMs across countries.
We extend our analysis looking at the time variation in the spread. Model 6 of
Table A16 includes country fixed effects, banking group fixed effects, as well as their
interaction with the term spread. The R2 of this specification (58%) is relatively high
but fifteen percentage points lower than the coefficient of determination of our base-
line model with month-country fixed effects and month-banking group fixed effects
(73%). As before, this suggests that the term spread is able to capture the time vari-
ation in the spread, but the relation with the dependent variable might be nonlinear.
In Figure 1 we observed that the evolution of the spread over time is directly related
to the evolution of the term spread. The positive and significant coefficients of the
interactions between country fixed effects and the term spread confirm this evidence.
As for the share of FRMs, in Belgium, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg and Slovenia the
spread is more sensitive to changes in the term spread. The Shorrocks-Shapley de-
composition of the R2 of model 6 eventually corroborates that the term spread is
mainly able to shift the demand, although the effect it exerts on the supply is slightly
higher than what is detected in Table 11.
8 Conclusions
Using granular bank level information from 103 banks belonging to 73 different bank-
ing groups across twelve countries in the euro area, we provide a comprehensive
analysis of the determinants of mortgage choice in the euro area. In particular, we
investigate to what degree the wide cross-country heterogeneity in the share of fixed
rate to total new mortgages is driven by differences in demand or supply conditions.
Relying on a prudent identification strategy, we are able to explore the role of
country demand and bank supply factors in determining households’ mortgage choice.
Specifically, we assume that lending policies are set at the consolidated level and can
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disentangle demand from supply by comparing the lending patterns observed for the
same cross-border banking group in different euro area economies, as well as the
lending patterns observed across different cross-border banking groups operating in
the same economy. Country demand conditions results to have a prominent role in
driving the prevalence of mortgages extended at a fixed rate. In particular, they are
able to explain almost 72% of the total variation of the share of fixed rate to total
new mortgages observed in the sample.
Factors such as the historical volatility of inflation rates, the correlation between
unemployment and the short-term interest rate, households’ financial literacy, and
the volume of outstanding mortgage covered bonds and mortgage-backed securities
exhibit a high correlation with the estimated demand component of fixed rate mort-
gages, relative to adjustable rate ones.
A predominant role for demand factors is documented also when focusing on the
sensitivity of the share of fixed rate mortgages to the slope of the yield curve, as well
as when analyzing lending conditions, that is the spread between the interest rate on
fixed rate mortgages and that on adjustable rate mortgages.
By showing the relevance of country demand factors, a policy implication of our
analysis is that it would not make sense to try to influence the share of fixed rate
mortgages by pressing banks to take on more duration risk. This would be ineffective
and, presumably, even not desirable. Indeed, the heterogeneity in the share of fixed
rate mortgages across economies seems to reflect an optimal allocation of interest
rate risk, given the asynchronous business cycles and the expectations that monetary
policy will operate in a way that stabilizes disposable income net of housing costs.
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Figure A1: Explanatory variables: Indebtedness, Real Disposable Income Per Capita,
Financial Literacy and Historical Inflation Volatility. Indebtedness is the ratio of total
outstanding debt as percentage of gross disposable income provided by the OECD on
a quarterly frequency. Data are missing for Latvia and Luxembourg, and partially
available for Greece, Italy and the Netherlands. Real Disposable Income Per Capita is
the gross disposable income (adjusted for social transfers in kind) of households (and
non-profit institutions serving households) expressed in purchasing power standard
(PPS) per inhabitant, obtained from Eurostat on an annual basis. Data are missing
for Luxembourg. Financial Literacy is measured as the percentage of 3 out of 4
answers correct given by adults interviewed in each country, as results from the S&P
Global FinLit Survey. Historical Inflation Volatility is the realized standard deviation
of the monthly month-on-month inflation rate during the period 1970-1999. Because
of a lack in the available data, Historical Inflation Volatility is computed over the
period 1991-1999 for Latvia and 1980-1999 for Slovenia.
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Figure A2: Explanatory variables: ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) is the realized
correlation between the unemployment rate and the short-term interest rate, calcu-
lated on a rolling window approach with a window of 7 years. Outstanding Covered
Bonds to GDP is the average over the last four years of the amount outstanding of
mortgage covered bonds as percentage of GDP. Data are missing for Slovenia. Out-
standing RMBS to GDP is the average over the last four quarters of the amount
outstanding of RMBS as percentage of GDP. Data are missing for Latvia, Luxem-
bourg and Slovenia and not available for all other countries in 2007.
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Table A6: Two stage regression analysis. First stage regressions including: month-
country fixed effects and year-banking group fixed effects (1), all explanatory variables
and year-banking group fixed effects (2). In the first stage regressions the dependent
variable is the share of FRMs. Second stage regressions of the estimated coefficients
of month-country fixed effects in (1) on: pure demand explanatory variables (3)
and all explanatory variables (4). Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model:
linear. Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy, Indebtedness, Real Disposable
Income Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR),
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to GDP. Standard
errors: not adjusted for model (1), two-way clustered by country and quarter for
model (2)-(4).
1ST STAGE 2ND TAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy -0.880 -3.772 -6.144***
(1.30) (2.06) (1.38)
Indebtedness 0.566 1.580 0.423
(0.54) (0.89) (0.63)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.014** 0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility -5.389*** -4.208** -6.587***
(0.57) (1.50) (0.73)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 20.945** 41.719* 37.293***
(6.53) (18.38) (8.91)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 1.053 5.094***
(1.39) (0.77)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP 0.026 2.680***
(0.87) (0.40)
Year-banking group FE YES YES
Month-country FE YES -
Two-way cluster - country, quarter country, quarter country, quarter
N 1085 1085 381 381
R2 0.844 0.758 0.349 0.500
Adjusted R2 0.748 0.749 0.341 0.490
F-test statistic regressors - - -
degrees of freedom - - -
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 295.46*** 68.34***
degrees of freedom (5,5) (4,5)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 1.940 25.27***
degrees of freedom (2,5) (2,5)
F-test statistic fixed effects 8.809***
degrees of freedom (413,672)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A10: Decomposition of the share of FRMs. Sample: cross-border banking
groups. Model: Tobit; lower bound 0 and upper bound 100 in model (1)-(3); lower
bound 1 and upper bound 99 in model (4)-(6). Displayed coefficients: marginal effects
of the censored variable E [y |x] at the sample means. Dependent variable: share of
FRMs. Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy, Indebtedness, Real Disposable
Income Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR),
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to GDP. Standard
errors: one-way clustered by country for model (1)-(2) and model (4)-(5), not adjusted
for model (3) and model (6).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Financial Literacy -0.502 -1.666 -0.516 -1.677
(1.64) (1.12) (1.66) (1.10)
Indebtedness 0.823* 0.593 0.820* 0.588
(0.45) (0.51) (0.46) (0.52)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.014*** -0.012***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility -5.146*** -5.720*** -5.164*** -5.737***
(1.04) (0.57) (1.05) (0.56)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 20.180* 23.842*** 19.999* 23.665***
(10.56) (7.35) (10.64) (7.39)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 1.411 1.416
(1.20) (1.18)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP 0.314 0.309
(0.70) (0.69)
Month-banking group FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Month-country FE - - YES - - YES
One-way cluster country country - country country -
N 1085 1085 1085 1085 1085 1085
Pseudo R2 0.787 0.791 0.852 0.787 0.790 0.852
LR test statistic 2075.750*** -
degrees of freedom 605 -
F-test statistic regressors 6263.96*** 2054.02*** 3.9e+06*** 1472.68***
degrees of freedom (5,721) (7,719) (5,721) (5,719)
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 433.93*** 435.72***
degrees of freedom (5,719) (5,719)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 2.16 2.20
degrees of freedom (2,719) (2,719)
lower bound 0 0 0 1 1 1
upper bound 100 100 100 99 99 99
left censored obs 0 0 0 3 3 3
right censored obs 0 0 0 6 6 6
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A11: Two stage regression analysis. First stage regressions including: month-
country fixed effects and quarter-banking group fixed effects (1), all explanatory vari-
ables and quarter-banking group fixed effects (2). In the first stage regressions the
dependent variable is the share of FRMs. Model: Tobit, lower bound 0 and upper
bound 100 in model (1)-(2). Displayed coefficients: marginal effects of the censored
variable E [y |x] at the sample means. Second stage regressions of the estimated coef-
ficients of month-country fixed effects in (1) on: pure demand explanatory variables
(3) and all explanatory variables (4). Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model:
linear. Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy, Indebtedness, Real Disposable In-
come Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR),
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to GDP. Standard er-
rors: not adjusted for model (1), one-way clustered by country for model (2), two-way
clustered by country and quarter for model (3)-(4).
1ST STAGE 2ND TAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy -1.608 -2.693 -5.386**
(1.08) (2.26) (1.72)
Indebtedness 0.576 1.558 0.206
(0.51) (0.99) (0.78)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.012*** 0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility -5.682*** -3.847** -6.482***
(0.60) (1.48) (0.87)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 23.390*** 33.128 28.726**
(7.20) (18.53) (9.79)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 1.414 5.754***
(1.16) (0.80)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP 0.309 2.756***
(0.67) (0.50)
Quarter-banking group FE YES YES
Month-country FE YES -
Clustering - country country, quarter country, quarter
N 1085 1085 N 344 344
Pseudo R2 0.847 0.780 R2 0.337 0.503
LR test statistic 2038.38*** Adjusted R2 0.327 0.492
degrees of freedom 463
F-test statistic regressors 193.13*** - -
degrees of freedom (5,959) - -
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 493.94*** 53.30***
degrees of freedom ( 5, 959) (5,5)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 2.36* 27.07***
degrees of freedom ( 2, 959) (2,5)
lower bound 0 0
upper bound 100 100
left censored obs 0 0
right censored obs 0 0
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A12: Two stage regression analysis. First stage regressions including: month-
country fixed effects and quarter-banking group fixed effects (1), all explanatory vari-
ables and quarter-banking group fixed effects (2). In the first stage regressions the
dependent variable is the share of FRMs. Model: Tobit, lower bound 1 and upper
bound 99 in model (1)-(2). Displayed coefficients: marginal effects of the censored
variable E [y |x] at the sample means. Second stage regression of the estimated coef-
ficients of month-country fixed effects in (1) on: pure demand explanatory variables
(3) and all explanatory variables (4). Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model:
linear. Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy, Indebtedness, Real Disposable In-
come Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR),
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to GDP. Standard er-
rors: not adjusted for model (1), one-way clustered by country for model (2), two-way
clustered by country and quarter for model (3)-(4).
1ST STAGE 2ND TAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy -1.599 -2.904 -5.744**
(1.05) (2.33) (1.73)
Indebtedness 0.572 1.506 0.087
(0.51) (1.03) (0.79)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.012*** 0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility -5.690*** -4.079** -6.857***
(0.59) (1.53) (0.88)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 23.163*** 33.141 28.596**
(7.20) (19.26) (10.05)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 1.406 6.052***
(1.13) (0.84)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP 0.295 2.882***
(0.65) (0.51)
Quarter-banking group FE YES YES
Month-country FE YES -
Clustering - country country, quarter country, quarter
N 1085 1085 N 344 344
Pseudo R2 0.847 0.780 R2 0.337 0.509
LR test statistic - Adjusted R2 0.327 0.499
degrees of freedom -
F-test statistic regressors 191.75*** - -
degrees of freedom (5,959) - -
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 511.37*** 52.55***
degrees of freedom (5, 959) (5, 5)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 2.41* 27.65***
degrees of freedom (2, 959) (2, 5)
lower bound 1 1
upper bound 99 99
left censored obs 3 3
right censored obs 6 6
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A14: Fixed-effects decomposition of the spread between FRMs and ARMs
interest rates. Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model: linear. Dependent
variable: spread between FRMs and ARMs interest rates. Standard errors: not
adjusted.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Month-country FE YES - YES YES
Month-banking group FE - YES YES YES
Bank FE - - - YES
N 1642 1642 1642 1642
R2 0.605 0.378 0.729 0.873
Adjusted R2 0.322 0.124 0.256 0.646
F-test statistic 2.139*** 1.486*** 1.540*** 3.842***
degrees of freedom (686,956) (478,1164) (1044,598) (1055,587)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table A15: Two-stage regression analysis of the spread between FRMs and ARMs
interest rates. First stage regressions including: month-country fixed effects and year-
banking group fixed effects (1), all explanatory variables and year-banking group fixed
effects (2). In the first stage regressions the dependent variable is the spread between
FRMs and ARMs interest rates. Second stage regressions of the estimated coefficients
of month-country fixed effects in (1) on: pure demand explanatory variables (3)
and all explanatory variables (4). Sample: cross-border banking groups. Model:
linear. Explanatory variables: Financial Literacy, Indebtedness, Real Disposable
Income Per Capita, Historical Inflation Volatility, ρ(Unemployment, Short-term IR),
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP and Outstanding RMBS to GDP. Standard
errors: not adjusted for model (1), two-way clustered by country and quarter for
model (2)-(4).
1ST STAGE 2ND TAGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Financial Literacy -0.044 0.041 0.014
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Indebtedness -0.006 -0.010 -0.007
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Real Disposable Income Per Capita -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Historical Inflation Volatility 0.008 0.042 0.015
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01)
ρ (Unemployment, Short-term IR) 0.012 -0.411 -0.183***
(0.25) (0.26) (0.04)
Outstanding Covered Bonds to GDP 0.045*** 0.020
(0.01) (0.03)
Outstanding RMBS to GDP -0.011 -0.039***
(0.01) (0.01)
Year-banking group FE YES YES
Month-country FE YES -
Two-way cluster - country, quarter country, quarter country, quarter
N 1085 1085 381 381
R2 0.616 0.534 0.249 0.348
Adjusted R2 0.380 0.517 0.239 0.336
F-test statistic regressors - - -
degrees of freedom - - -
F-test statistic regressors pure demand 34.62*** 546.84***
degrees of freedom (5,5) (4,5)
F-test statistic regressors institutional demand 9.37** 8.95**
degrees of freedom (2,5) (2,5)
F-test statistic fixed effects 2.614
degrees of freedom (413,672)
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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